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May It Please the Court
by David F. Forte
May it please the court. So the advocate begins…with a prayer. What is it that the coun-
selor prays may please the court? We know 
that what pleases a legislator is having enough 
votes. What pleases a governor or president is 
having his orders obeyed. But what pleases a 
court is its being convinced of the rightness of 
the cause. The court wants reason, reason that 
persuades.
In the Anglo-American scheme of justice, 
more than any other, courts must give reasons 
for their judgment. They have to justify their 
conclusions before all. They are obliged to be 
transparent in reaching the conclusion that 
will change the lives or fortunes of those be-
fore them. Having enough votes is not a suf-
ficient justification. Having the prerogative of 
executive decision is not enough for the judges. 
As Alexander Hamilton noted, judges have no 
power of the purse. They have no army. Their 
only weapon is the reasons they proffer.
Hadley Arkes offers a brilliant manifesto 
for natural law. In it, he suggests that judges do 
not pay enough attention to reason, that their 
realm of reason is too circumscribed—and he 
levels the criticism at both modern liberal and 
conservative judges. He urges them to reach 
out specifically to the principles of the natural 
law. Yet the judges resist the invitation. They 
seem always to have resisted the invitation. 
Why is that so? Why are natural law rea-
sons resisted? Arkes asks. Why do judges not 
seek a proper grounding of their judgment in 
natural law?
Two Kinds of Natural Law
When arkes speaks of natural law, he does so in two forms, though in his narrative, he seems to collapse 
the two. In one, which we may call “right rea-
son,” Arkes speaks to the “nature of the thing.” 
Thus, he says, John Marshall reasoned in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland (1819) that the power giv-
en by the Constitution to the federal govern-
ment to establish something must necessarily 
and logically include the power to preserve it. 
Article I, Section 8 provides Congress with 
the power “To establish Post Offices and Post 
Roads.” One does not need an explicit grant 
of the power in the Constitution to say that 
Congress has the power to protect the mails, 
through punitive legislation. It inheres in the 
nature of the grant of power, that is, “in the 
nature of the thing.” This form of demonstra-
tion, or right reason, is implicit in the art of 
judging. In fact, this form of demonstration 
does often please the court, and it should.
Arkes himself notes that even the conser-
vative justices, whom he otherwise criticizes, 
often correctly use this form of natural law, 
i.e., right reason. So, for example, Arkes ap-
plauds Justice Scalia’s employment of princi-
ples of “propositional logic” when he disputes 
Justice Kennedy’s definition that whatever “af-
fects” waters is itself “waters within the Unit-
ed States” (as defined in the Clean Water Act 
and its subsequent regulations and judicial 
interpretations). 
But there is another aspect to the natural 
law that Arkes describes, which we may call 
moral axioms. It is here where he finds the 
conservative justices falling short. He regrets 
it when a court has an opportunity to base its 
decision on moral axioms and instead turns to 
original understanding or other devices. Thus 
in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), estab-
lishing the right to bear arms as an individual 
right under the Second Amendment, Arkes 
criticizes Justice Scalia for considering the 
right of self-preservation not as a moral axiom 
applied to the human person as such, but as 
a principle that was in the positive law of the 
Constitution. The right of self-preservation 
can be a ground for the decision, according 
to Scalia, because it is part of the original un-
derstanding, not because it is a principle that 
supervenes the Constitution itself.
Scalia recoils from the use of moral first 
principles as a basis for judicial decision-mak-
ing. He has opined, 
Maybe my very stingy view, my very 
parsimonious view, of the role of natural 
law and Christianity in the governance 
of the state comes from the fact that I 
am a judge, and it is my duty to apply 
the law. And I do not feel empowered 
to revoke those laws that I do not con-
sider good laws. If they are stupid laws, 
I apply them anyway, unless they go so 
contrary to my conscience that I must 
resign.
And so, here, Arkes is correct in the ob-
servation that forms the basis of his regret. 
It is the enunciation of moral axioms as the 
ground of decision that does not please the 
court. Justice Scalia, of course, is not alone. In 
fact, he is heir to a long and articulate tradi-
tion, which Professor Arkes knows very well. 
But what animates this tradition? Why are 
otherwise wise, intelligent, and morally acute 
judges so averse to going outside the positive 
law to search for first principles, as Arkes 
urges them to do? The answer is that the posi-
tive law itself binds the judge within a moral 
framework, and Anglo-American judges find 
that moral framework sufficient unto itself.
The Nature of Positive Law
To understand the tension between the moral imperatives of the natural law and the way judges come to actual 
decisions, we need to complete our picture. 
We need to see what the actual moral experi-
ence of judging is, not just what it would be if 
confined to propositional logic.
Of all the founders, Hamilton best under-
stood the nature of judging. In Federalist 78 
he described the Constitution’s tripartite divi-
sion of powers. He ascribed “FORCE” to the 
executive, “WILL” to the legislature, and the 
more circumspect “JUDGMENT” to the judi-
ciary. He said that the judiciary would be the 
least dangerous branch. Why would it be the 
least dangerous branch? As Hamilton’s Anti-
Federalist opponents asked, do not judges in 
robes have the same passion for power as do 
congressmen in frock coats? 
Hamilton agreed with James Madison that 
mere parchment barriers would not keep the 
judges from abusing the rights of others. Nor 
did he rely upon the force of philosophic logic 
to restrain the judge. And Hamilton and the 
framers intentionally left the courts free from 
most of the checks placed on the other de-
partments of government, precisely to leave 
the judiciary independent. If not parchment 
rules, if not the force of philosophical logic, if 
not checks and balances, what then can we 
rely upon to restrain judges?
Hamilton, joined by the other framers, 
has an answer: it is virtue. The particular kind 
of virtue that inheres in the positive law of the 
court. Through the moral matrix of the posi-
tive law, the judge learns the art of virtue, lit-
erally the Aristotelian habit of acting rightly. 
Everywhere a judge turns, he is bound by the 
instructive moral limits of his craft. Let us 
consider them. 
There is, to begin, the positive law of stat-
utes, of administrative regulations, and of 
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executive orders. Quoting St. Augustine, St. 
Thomas Aquinas writes that “In these earth-
ly laws, though men judge about them when 
they are making them, when once they are 
established and passed, the judges may judge 
no longer of them, but according to them.” 
Thus the courts are bound by rules of statu-
tory interpretation. By respecting the author-
ity of the legislature and the executive, the 
courts affirm the political legitimacy of those 
branches that have a closer accountability to 
the people. Courts that are faithful to the 
positive law of statutes thereby strengthen 
the legitimacy of the polity. 
A second element in the moral matrix of 
positive law is the law of the court, or the rules 
of precedent or stare decisis. Precedent oper-
ates as a form of judicially created statute, 
which, like a legislative statute, is binding but 
which still must be interpreted. There is, to 
be sure, a lively contemporary debate over 
whether incorrect interpretations of the Con-
stitution should be maintained under the rule 
of stare decisis. Whatever the correct resolu-
tion of that conflict should be in particular 
cases, it is nonetheless telling that the debate 
would have no traction at all if precedent did 
not have a binding function on courts.
There is an additional parallel between the 
law of statutes and the law of precedents: both 
direct a judge’s attention to what has gone be-
fore. Both testify to the fact that the law that 
comes to the judge is de lege lata, something 
already laid down, as opposed to de lege fer-
enda, law as it ought to be. Thus do both the 
law of statutes and the law of the court chan-
nel the judge away from subjective preferences. 
We should mention here that part of the law 
of the court is the law of judicial system, by 
which lower courts follow the rules laid down 
by superior courts within their jurisdiction. 
The system provides consistency and coher-
ence in the law throughout the country in its 
thousands of applications.
A third element is the law of process, which 
limits what a court can hear, what evidence 
may be admitted, and how a court may dis-
pense legal justice. As every law student 
learns—and what every lawyer and judge 
knows—courts may not choose what issues to 
decide. They are limited to cases, which means 
that there must be a plaintiff (or petitioner), a 
defendant (or respondent) and a legal cause of 
action. The parties must have standing, the is-
sue must be ripe, must not be moot, and the 
court must have jurisdiction.
A fourth element of the law is the positive 
law of the subject, or legal doctrine. Every legal 
dispute is brought in one or more subject area, 
each of which has its own complex concepts, 
standards, and history. Each subject—wheth-
er it be contract law, tort law, anti-trust law, 
tax law, bankruptcy law, divorce law, corpora-
tion law, or any of the other myriad substan-
tive subjects taught at law school and contin-
ued on in the practice of lawyers—has a co-
herent and definable content, known in legal 
studies as “doctrine.” The vast detail and the 
motivating principles in every area provide a 
positive law of direct relevance to the resolu-
tion of each particular legal dispute.
A fifth element is the positive law of the case, 
or res judicata. Once a case has been fully and 
completely decided, no court may revise or re-
open the litigation. Although the legislature 
may change the underlying law and affect the 
legal rights of the parties even in an ongoing 
case, once the dispute has been resolved judi-
cially, not even a legislative act can change the 
rights and duties of the parties decisively de-
termined by the court.
A sixth constraint is the positive law of the 
judge, or judicial ethics. The appropriate be-
havior of judges has been part of Western le-
gal concern for centuries. In the United States, 
the American Bar Association first adopted 
Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924. In 1972, 
the Canons were revised and redacted into a 
Code of Judicial Conduct that served as the 
basis for nearly all state codes of judicial con-
duct. The Code covers such areas of judicial 
conduct as compliance with the law, diligence 
and impartiality, conflict of interest, and elec-
toral activities. In addition, federal statutes 
cover disqualification and recusal of judges.
A seventh element is the positive law of law, 
or what makes an enactment truly binding. 
For law must have certain internal elements 
for it to be law, and not just an arbitrary or 
absurd act. The principle of legality was help-
fully illuminated in the famous 1958 debate 
between Leon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart in the 
pages of the Harvard Law Review. Although 
Fuller referred to his theory as “internal nat-
ural law,” his view is more of a delineation of 
the nature of positive law, qua law, and the 
outer moral limits of what a judge can en-
force as true positive law. For positive law to 
be legal, argues Fuller, it needs to have certain 
internal attributes: the rules must be general, 
publicly promulgated, prospective, clear and 
understandable, consistent, capable of being 
complied with, relatively stable, and adminis-
tered faithfully. Without these elements, an 
enactment would be void for vagueness, or 
for arbitrariness. It simply would not be law.
An eighth ingredient of the moral fabric of 
positive law is the law of reason, or more exactly, 
the law of reasons. As noted, the Anglo-Ameri-
can legal system’s hallmark is the judge’s mor-
al accountability for his decision, particularly 
at the appellate level. He must give reasons, 
publicly stated, justifying his decision, open 
for criticism and rational impeachment. It is 
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not enough for the judge to follow the various 
elements of the positive law, as outlined above. 
He must demonstrate to the people and the 
polity that he has been faithful to the positive 
law. Not only, therefore, is the judge bound by 
the moral constraints of the positive law, he 
must be transparently bound.
All of the above impels a judge in the 
American legal system to adhere to the law 
of the Constitution, which provides the moral 
basis for originalism. Professor Arkes has 
criticized originalism, partly because it is in-
determinate and there are multiple disagree-
ments about what the original understand-
ing is. But if disagreement about the prin-
ciples of natural law are no logical barrier to 
there being a right interpretation of natural 
law, so too disagreement about the original 
understanding of the Constitution is no bar-
rier to there being a right understanding of 
what the founding generation meant by the 
words they so laboriously put into the Con-
stitution. 
Besides, the moral suasion of originalism 
is necessary to the virtue of the judicial craft. 
In Marbury v. Madison (1803), Marshall in-
sisted that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution 
contemplated [i.e., intended] that instrument 
as a rule for the government of courts, as well 
as of the legislature.” In words that judges 
and academics might well contemplate today, 
Marshall said,
Why, otherwise, does the Constitution 
direct judges to take an oath to support 
it? This oath certainly applies in an es-
pecial manner to their conduct in their 
official behavior [i.e., their judicial craft]. 
How immoral to impose it on them if 
they were to be used as the instruments, 
and the knowing instruments for violat-
ing what they swear to support.”
Judicial Craft
The judge who faithfully abides by the positive law in all the ways outlined above performs a rationally moral task 
without the need to refer to natural law prin-
ciples that lie at the base of law’s function, and, 
in many cases, of law’s substance. This is the 
phronesis of the judge, the practical wisdom, 
the virtue of prudence. Prudence does not 
mean, “let’s compromise until the time is ripe 
for getting what we want.” Prudence is the abil-
ity to do what is optimally right in a situation of 
contingent variables. It is not what is temporar-
ily right. It is right in the moment of deciding 
what is right. Abraham Lincoln, let it be re-
membered, practiced prudence, while William 
Lloyd Garrison would not let anything contin-
gent stand in the way of his categorical impera-
tive. Garrison was the advocate of moral abso-
lutism, while Lincoln was the true originalist.
Many of us are familiar with a scene in 
Robert Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons, in 
which Thomas More engages his son-in-law 
William Roper in a debate over the problem 
of too many positive laws standing in the way 
of getting at what’s right.
Roper: So, now you give the Devil the 
benefit of law!
More: Yes! What would you do? Cut a 
great road through the law to get after 
the Devil?
Roper: Yes, I’d cut down every law in 
England to do that!
More: Oh? And when the last law was 
down, and the Devil turned ’round 
on you, where would you hide, Roper, 
the laws all being flat? This country is 
planted thick with laws, from coast to 
coast, Man’s laws, not God’s! And if you 
cut them down, and you’re just the man 
to do it, do you really think you could 
stand upright in the winds that would 
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blow then? Yes, I’d give the Devil ben-
efit of law, for my own safety’s sake!
What would happen if we cut down the 
positive laws of the judge to get at the moral 
axioms? What would happen if we put the 
axe to the rules of statutory interpretation, 
or to stare decisis, or to res judicata, or to the 
rules of due process, or to judicial and legal 
ethics, or to legal doctrine, or to the principle 
of legality, or to the justification by reason, or 
to originalism? What would happen if we did 
that? What would we do then when the Devil 
turned ’round on us?
We’d get the wages of what the legal real-
ists did to the traditional moral constraints 
of judging, when they urged judges to follow 
WILL and not JUDGMENT. We’d get Roe 
v. Wade (1973) and over 40 million dead hu-
man beings.
The problem with Roe v. Wade is not that 
it violated the norms of natural law. Cer-
tainly it did so manifestly. The true problem 
with Roe v. Wade is that it did not follow 
the ethical norms of positive law of the court. 
In that case, Justice Blackmun violated the 
law of the court by ignoring the tradition of 
cases opposed to such an innovative “right.” 
He violated the principle of legality by propos-
ing a rule that had little internal consistency. 
He violated the law of reason, for the opinion 
was simply a diktat declaring a result that 
had no colorable reasoning behind it with a 
flippant disregard of the norms of justifica-
tion and transparency. Blackmun violated 
the positive law of the Constitution, for there 
was no privacy right encompassing abortion 
in the original understanding of liberty or 
in any reasonable application of the original 
understanding.
Roe v. Wade is not just censurable be-
cause it violates natural law. It is censurable 
because Justice Blackmun violated the most 
fundamental moral norms of the positive law, 
prompting the famous observation of John Ely, 
“It is…a very bad decision…because it is bad 
constitutional law, or rather because it is not 
constitutional law and gives almost no sense 
of an obligation to try to be.”
The natural law song has many notes. Thus 
I suggest that the renewed natural law project 
can succeed if we take the categorical impera-
tives of Kant, and place them in the practical 
wisdom of Aristotle, within the prudence of 
Aquinas, and come to see the phenomeno-
logical vibrancy of the morality of the judicial 
craft itself. 
May it please the court.
David F. Forte is a professor of law at the Cleve-
land-Marshall College of Law and an acting mu-
nicipal judge in Lakewood, Ohio. Portions of this 
essay were drawn from an article in A Second 
Look at First Things: A Case for Conservative 
Politics, edited by Francis J. Beckwith, et al. (St. 
Augustine’s Press).
The Need for Natural Law
by Michael M. Uhlmann
In hadley arkes’s “manifesto” we have an elegant restatement of the case for nat-ural law and an elegant summary, as well, 
of the ideas that have informed Arkes’s think-
ing over four decades. It is a fitting inaugural 
to the establishment of the Claremont Insti-
tute’s new center for the study and applica-
tion of natural law principles. The Center has 
many godfathers, but none more influential 
than Harry V. Jaffa. Natural law, it has been 
said, always returns to bury its pallbearers, 
and few in our time have done more than Pro-
fessor Jaffa to revive interest in the subject. 
We have in David Forte’s response an 
equally elegant commentary on why judges—
even judges who are friendly to the idea of nat-
ural law as a philosophical proposition—may 
be indisposed to acknowledge the authority of 
natural law as a guide to adjudication. Profes-
sor Forte, no less than Professor Arkes, recog-
nizes the limits of legal positivism; but he also 
reminds us that positive law has moral virtues 
that natural law enthusiasts are sometimes 
prone to disregard. As Forte puts it, “We 
need to see what the actual moral experience 
of judging is, not just what it would be if con-
fined to propositional logic.”
Because I recently wrote at some length, and 
favorably, about Professor Arkes’s effort to in-
still a deeper appreciation for the moral logic 
that necessarily undergirds all law (“Natural 
Law Man,” Winter 2010-Spring 2011 CRB), I 
will not further dwell on the matter here. In-
stead, I would like to offer some observations 
on Professor Forte’s response, and then follow 
that with a few suggestions regarding the new 
center.
Forte suggests that many judges are reluc-
tant to venture beyond the confines of posi-
tive law, not because they abjure the impor-
tance of morals, but because “the positive law 
bounds judges within a moral framework, 
and Anglo-American judges find that moral 
framework sufficient unto itself.” That moral 
framework, he says, may be found by examin-
ing various criteria of positive law that guide 
judges in their work: the binding authority of 
statutory enactments and executive orders; 
respect for precedent, the formalities of le-
gal process, and prevalent legal doctrine; the 
finality of decisions once rendered; the au-
thority of judicial ethics; “the positive law of 
law,” by which is meant certain internal at-
tributes (such as public promulgation, clarity, 
and stable administration) that distinguish 
law as such from arbitrary diktat; and, finally, 
what Forte calls “the law of reasons,” or the 
duty to explain, publicly and usually in writ-
ing, the rationale behind decisions. He argues 
that these criteria, taken together and rightly 
understood, enable a judge to “ply his craft in 
consonance with natural law without needing 
to give it formal judicial notice.”
There is much to what Forte says, and he is 
right that most of these criteria, consciously 
or unconsciously, derive from or rely upon 
principles of natural-law reasoning. His list 
delineates the necessary moral conditions for 
the rule of law that binds, or ought to bind, 
judges. The question, however, is whether 
his list is sufficient. I think it is not, which is 
why I am attracted to Arkes’s argument that 
we need to be more explicit about the moral 
ground of legal reasoning. 
The Limits of Positive Law
Toward the end of his response, forte quotes a famous passage in Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons in which 
Thomas More instructs his well-meaning but 
somewhat impetuous son-in-law about heed-
ing the commands of positive law. I know the 
passage well; indeed, A Man for All Seasons is 
a staple of one of my courses. More’s statement 
is a moving and eloquent defense of the rule 
of law, one redolent with themes articulated 
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